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                The Planning Stages (1927-1939) 
               
                Our story begins in early 1927, when Lieutenant General Sir Webb 
                Gillman together with two engineering officers, were sent to Singapore 
                by the War Office to review the scale of defences proposed by 
                the CID (Committee of Imperial Defence). The main thinking behind 
                the CID's defence proposals was based on the now infamous sole 
                assumption, that in order to capture SIngapore, an enemy would 
                need to conduct a full scale attack by sea using warships. 
                 
                Once in Singapore, Gillman and his commission quickly came to 
                the conclusion that the current and planned defences for Singapore 
                island was already more than adequate and in some respects might 
                even be over the top! 
                 
                As to wether there should be a need for a coastal battery at Pengerang, 
                the deciding factor boiled down to a narrow strait between Pulau 
                Tekong and Pengerang on the mainland, known as the Calder passage. 
                Except for small motor boats, this passage was assumed to be too 
                narrow and shallow for large vessels to navigate. The Admiralty 
                also had plans to block this passage with a anti motor boat boom. 
                With these points taken into account, Gillman and members of his 
                Commission found that there was no need for the proposed battery 
                at Pengerang to protect this area. 
                 
                Later that year in November, with Gillman and his commission having 
                returned to England, the wheels of military bureaucracy rolled 
                on, and a Sub-Committee of high ranking officers, chaired by Gillman 
                himself, was charged to review the completed study. This Sub-Committee 
                would go on to fully endorse the findings of Gillman and his Gillman's 
                Commission. 
                 
                As for the Pengerang battery question, the submitted report stated, 
                "now that the Admiralty are proposing to block the Calder 
                passage, we agree that it is unnecessary to have any 6" guns 
                and lights at Pengerang". On April 2nd 1928, 
                the Chiefs of Staff accepted the recommendations of the Sub-Committee 
                and plans for a coastal battery at Pengerang was thus scrapped. 
                 
                It's important to note with hindsight that the main points supporting 
                the final decision was terribly flawed. It was to be later accepted 
                that Calder passage was in fact deep enough to allow enemy destroyers 
                to "creep" up the passage, an anti motor boat boom in 
                this case would be totally useless to stop a vessel of this size. 
                But even this is academic, as no anti motor boat was ever installed 
                at any time leading up to 1936. . 
                 
                  
                Nine years then rolled by and in 1936 with the new appointment 
                of GOC (General-Officer-Commanding) William Dobbie, the perspective 
                views on a coastal battery at Pengerang would once again shift. 
                 
                Dobbie pointed out to the war office that the defences of the 
                eastern channel was dangerously weak: "I think 
                it is imperative to put an additional battery on Pengerang, this 
                will greatly strengthen position generally and in addition would 
                provide direct defence of channel through Calder harbour". 
                 
                Dobbie's view as to the whole point of the concept of a "Fortress 
                Singapore", was the Naval base itself. It was in his own 
                words, the "raison d'entre of the fortress". 
                Without adequate defences for the naval base, the whole fortress 
                idea was flawed. 
                 
                Some concerns were raised by military heads that with any proposed 
                6" battery there might be a drain on troops. Dobbie however 
                pointed out that in war it would be necessary to hold Pengerang 
                with infantry, irrespective of a battery being there or not, as 
                Pengerang had already a key observation post atop of Bukit Johore 
                and was defended by men of the Indian State Forces. 
                 
                The accepted advantages of having a battery at 
                Pengerang were thus put forth: -  
                It would provide additional depth to the defences of the main 
                channel leading to the naval base in addition to covering Calder 
                harbour. Pengerang also provides a broadside shoot, as opposed 
                to an end-on shoot from Tekong, and that the main arc or fire 
                is at right angles to that of existing defences on Tekong. Therefore, 
                it will be difficult to blind the whole British defences with 
                an enemy smoke screen, if such a tactic were to be used. The only 
                disadvantage with Pengerang is that it is so isolated, supplies 
                such as raw materials in this case would need to be obtained locally. 
                 
                With Dobbies full weight behind a Pengerang based coastal battery 
                the project finally got a green light. The exact date of construction 
                and completion of the defences at Pengerang is still a mystery, 
                but from one report I do know it was completed just before January 
                1939. Estimated cost of construction was put at around the sixty 
                thousand pound mark. 
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